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Limb apraxia, a disorder of higher order motor control, has long been a challenge for
clinical assessment and understanding (Leiguarda and Marsden, 2000). The deficits
originally described in limb apraxia (Liepmann, 1920) have been classified by the nature
of the errors made by the patients leading to, namely, ideational and ideomotor apraxia.
The dual stream hypothesis (Goodale and Milner, 1992) has been used to explain
these categories: ideational apraxia is thought to relate to a deficit in the concept
of a movement (coded in the ventral stream). Patients have difficulty using objects,
sequencing actions to interact with them or pantomiming their use. Ideomotor apraxia,
on the other hand, is thought to arise from problems in the accurate implementation of
movements within the dorsal stream. One of the limitations on understanding apraxia
is the failure by the clinical literature to draw on knowledge of the factors determining
actions in the environment. Here we emphasize the role of affordance. There is much
recent work indicating that our responses to stimuli are strongly influenced by the actions
that the objects “afford”, based on their physical properties and the intentions of the
actor (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998). The concept of affordance, originally suggested
by Gibson (1979) has been incorporated in a recent model of interactive behavior
that draws from findings in non-human primates, namely the “affordance competition
hypothesis” (Cisek, 2007). This postulates that interactive behavior arises by a process
of competition between possible actions elicited by the environment. In this paper we
argue that “affordance competition” may play a role in apraxia. We review evidence
that at least some aspects of apraxia may reflect an abnormal sensitivity to competition
when multiple affordances are present (Riddoch et al., 1998) and/or a poor ability to
exert cognitive control over this competition when it occurs. This framework suggests
a new way of conceptualizing deficits in apraxia which invites further investigations
in the field.
Keywords: limb apraxia, ideational apraxia, ideomotor apraxia, affordance competition hypothesis, route to action
model
Introduction
Limb apraxia is a heterogeneous disorder of higher order motor control affecting skilled and
learnt actions. It has traditionally been classified by the nature of the errors made by patients
and the brain pathways with which these errors are associated (Liepmann, 1920; Leiguarda
and Marsden, 2000). Sub-aspects of the disorder have been broadly classified as reflecting
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impairments of the conceptual representation of actions leading
to ideational apraxia, or of the implementation of these
concepts, termed ideomotor apraxia, or, if the impairment
pertains exclusively to skilled use of finger or hand gestures, to
limb kinetic apraxia (Faglioni and Basso, 1985; Leiguarda and
Marsden, 2000).
These definitions of apraxia have been strongly debated in
the literature (Buxbaum, 2001; Buxbaum et al., 2007) but share
a common basis within traditional cognitive theories which view
perception, decision-making and actions serially as depicted by
‘‘box-and-arrows’’ models, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Heilman
and Rothi, 1997).
Traditional models of apraxia have relied on observational
qualitative data and they have typically remained descriptive.
Sometimes they contradict observations of patients in real life
leading to difficulties defining particular subtypes (e.g., ideational
vs. ideomotor, Buxbaum, 2001) or the brain areas involved (e.g.,
parietal vs. ventral premotor, Pazzaglia et al., 2008; Kalénine et al.,
2010).
This article describes a theoretical framework called the
‘‘affordance competition hypothesis’’ (Cisek, 2007) which offers
an alternative view of apraxia. Our aim is to explore how this
proposal could influence our understanding of this complex
disorder.
The affordance competition hypothesis derives from
ecological psychology and aims to describe real-time
interactive behavior in terms of processes that specify
potential actions and select between them (Cisek and
Kalaska, 2010). According to this hypothesis, processes
generating behavior are resolved in parallel, instead of in
a serial manner, through competition between currently
available opportunities and demands for action (Cisek,
2007).
FIGURE 1 | Models of cognitive processing pathways in apraxia (Rothi
et al., 1991). Adapted from Bickerton et al. (2012) (with permission).
We will firstly define the affordance competition hypothesis.
This is followed by a review of the patient literature to identify
examples that support this hypothesis. We finish by exploring
predictions from this hypothesis, relevant to different aspects of
limb apraxia.
Part 1: Defining the Affordance
Competition Hypothesis
Traditional cognitive theories view the selection and specification
of actions in terms of an information processing framework.
According to this, perception involves the construction
of various levels of internal representations of the world
(Biederman, 1972; Marr, 1982) that are used to inform the
cognitive system which makes decisions, which in turn can be
implemented into action plans by the motor system (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1981; Shafir and Tversky, 1995).
Studies reported in recent neurophysiological experiments
suggest that this perspective fails to provide a unified account
of behavior (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005). There are cases in
which functions that should be distinct and appear to involve
the same regions, or even the same cells, and others in
which functions that should be unified appear distributed
throughout the brain. An example of the former is the
role of the lateral intraparietal area (LIP). This has been
proposed to include control of gaze (Snyder et al., 1997), the
representation of space in a body-centered reference frame
(Snyder et al., 1998), and the representation of abstract decision
variables such as expected utility (Platt and Glimcher, 1999).
An example of the latter derives from the neuropsychology
literature, and particularly the proposal of the dual stream
hypothesis (Goodale and Milner, 1992). This postulates a
ventral stream pathway dedicated for object identification
distinct from a dorsal stream pathway for the control of
action in space, with no account of how the two may
integrate to generate real-time behaviors (Schenk and McIntosh,
2010).
An alternative hypothesis for interpreting neural data, which
proposes to resolve contradicting results and account for real-
time interactive behaviors has been proposed (Cisek, 2007; Cisek
and Kalaska, 2010). The ‘‘affordance competition hypothesis’’
views interactive behavior as involving simultaneous processes
that specify potential motor actions and select between them.
A mathematical model by which the cerebral cortex may
implement competition between representations of visually-
guided reaching actions within the dorsal stream is used
as an example (Cisek, 2007). In this model attended visual
stimuli elicit the generation of motor plans across visuomotor
regions. An action is selected to be performed by a process of
competition—implemented by a neural mechanism of mutual
inhibitory connections influenced by biasing inputs from
decision centers.
The concept of affordance, introduced by Gibson (1979),
proposes that visual objects and their properties give rise
to action representations. For example a handle ‘‘affords’’ to
be pulled. These action representations depend on contextual
demands from the task (Young, 2006).
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FIGURE 2 | Adapted from Fagg and Arbib (1998) publication on the
Fagg-Arbib-Rizzolatti and Sakata (FARS) model for grasping.
The Anterior intraparietal area (AIP) uses visual input to extract several features
of the object that are relevant to grasping it—i.e., Affordances. Ventral premotor
areas represent a corresponding set of grasp options constrained by task
information, instruction stimuli, working memory of recently executed grasps
(represented in prefrontal areas that specify task set and influence decision
making within dorsal and ventral premotor areas).
Fagg and Arbib (1998) have modelled grasp behaviors
in a similar way (see Figure 2). According to this, action
programming can be triggered by sensory cues without the
invocation of high-level object recognition processes in the
ventral stream. They emphasized the importance of current goals,
tasks and internal states of the action system in determining this
type of ‘‘action oriented perception’’ (Arbib, 1997).
Cognitive psychological studies in humans have described
affordances in relation to stimulus-response compatibility
effects. In a seminal experiment by Tucker and Ellis (1998),
participants had to make a button press response with their right
or left hand to indicate the orientation of an object presented on
a screen. They observed that, when an object with an elongated
handle was presented, responses were faster when the responding
hand was compatible with grasping the handle relative to when
the hand was in an incompatible position. Tucker and Ellis
(1998) proposed that visuo-motor relations between objects and
actions activate a motor response for object-use ‘‘automatically’’,
even when if the response is not required by the task. These
compatibility effects could be elicited for different aspects of
objects (e.g., the position of a handle, the size of an object) and
have been referred to as ‘‘micro-affordances’’ (Ellis and Tucker,
2000).
However Cisek’s (2007) definition of affordances goes beyond
action specification for object interactions. Rather affordances
are defined as any opportunity for action provided by the
environment. Cisek (2007) proposes that neural activity in the
dorsal stream implements a functionally motivated mixture
of variables simultaneously as sets of competing sensorimotor
loops, rather than serial stages of a representation of objects in
space, a representation ofmotor plans, or cognitive variables such
as expected values. His model allows action specification to occur
in parallel with action selection.
A number of predictions arise from this model which
could be applicable for both abstract and object-directed
actions. According to the model, each population in a neural
network for action selection is proposed to involve competitive
interactions, with biasing influencesmodulating this competition
in different neural regions. Since cortico-cortical connections
are bidirectional, any decision which starts to emerge in one
region will propagate to other regions. In this way, decisions
based on sensory features, which may be salient for action
specification (see Figure 2), may first appear in parietal cortex
and then influence frontal activity. In contrast decisions based
on abstract rules may first be expressed in frontal regions
and propagate backward to parietal areas. The competition
between representations of potential actions is balanced by the
accumulation of evidence in favor of a given choice leading to a
decision by a process of ‘‘distributed consensus’’. These proposals
have implications for behaviors observed in patients, which we
discuss below.
Part 2: Examples of Affordance
Competition in Patients
There are several examples in support of ‘‘affordance
competition’’ in the animal literature (Cisek and Kalaska,
2010). In this section we review the evidence for similar
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processes taking place in humans, and more importantly in
patient populations, relating to actions targeted to handled
objects, more specific to deficits in limb apraxia. This might
allow us to answer the question of whether the affordance
competition hypothesis could provide a useful framework for
understanding limb apraxia, going beyond previous models in
the field (Rothi et al., 1991; Bartolo et al., 2001; Buxbaum et al.,
2007).
Riddoch et al. (1998) studied a patient with cortico-basal
degeneration who showed strong automatic grasp actions to
objects. They explored a task in which the patient had to reach
and grasp a cup using the hand that was on the same side of the
table as the cup. When the cup was on the left, and its handle
oriented to the right, the patient tended not to grasp the object
with her left hand (the required response) but rather grasped it
with her right hand—the action being cued by the orientation of
the object in relation to the patient’s preferred hand. Interestingly
this grasp action decreased when the cup was inverted, even
though the physical positioning of the handle was the same
as when the cup was upright. These data suggest that it was
the familiar positioning of the cup, in its upright location, that
triggered the grasp action to the handle. This pattern of behavior
was not observed when patients were asked to point with their left
or right hand depending on the location of the cup, suggesting
an influence of the intended action on these affordance effects
(Hommel, 2000; Linnell et al., 2005; Humphreys and Riddoch,
2007).
In a previous study, Riddoch et al. (1989) described a patient
with a modality-specific deficit. This patient showed deficits in
pantomiming the use of visually-presented objects only when
they were asked to use their right (contralesional) hand. Patient
CD had no difficulties in pantomiming actions to objects with his
left hand and he was also able to pantomime actions to names
using his right hand. However he had a hand- and modality-
specific deficit (right hand, seen objects). The fact that the
patient could pantomime actions using his right hand suggests
that there was not an ‘‘ideomotor’’ problem in effecting right
hand actions. Also the fact that he could make actions to seen
objects with his left hand indicates that the problem was not
an ‘‘ideational’’ disorder. To account for the result, Riddoch
et al. (1989) proposed that CD had difficulties in selecting the
appropriate action with his right hand whenmultiple affordances
were offered by the seen object. That is, there was difficulty
in selecting a hand-specific action when multiple actions were
evoked for the right hand. Note that, when given the name of an
object, multiple affordances would not be invoked, and CD was
able to act under those conditions. These results were simulated
in an explicit computational model of affordance competition by
Yoon et al. (2002).
A further study reported evidence for affordance effects
between multiple objects. Humphreys et al. (2000) presented
patients showing utilization behavior with multiple objects and
asked them to perform an unusual action with two of the items
(e.g., ‘‘put the saucer on the cup’’). Despite being able to repeat
back the instruction, patients made errors by carrying out the
familiar action (e.g., they put the cup on the saucer). This was not
solely due to the familiarity of the actions offered by the objects.
When asked to perform an unfamiliar action that contravened
an affordance offered by the physical properties of the stimuli
(e.g., ‘‘with the cup stir the pencil’’—when they could make a
stirring action using a cup over a pencil) patients made errors by
carrying out the afforded (novel) action (e.g., stirring the pencil in
the cup). Humphreys et al. (2000) proposed that affordances are
offered not only by single objects but also by arrays of multiple
objects which can afford different actions when used together.
The affordance could be based purely on the physical properties
of individual objects but also on learned interactions (as in the
cup-saucer example above).The presence of multiple affordances
in these more complex situations could then contribute to some
of the additional symptoms associated with apraxia, such as poor
sequencing of behaviors.
These pieces of evidence for both hand-specific and multi-
object affordances highlight that, even when we make simple
actions to objects, several affordances can be present and evoked
separately for each hand and for different object combinations.
In utilization behavior there is a difficulty in using task-based
constraints to moderate strongly afforded actions. In apraxia
there can be a problem in selecting the appropriate action
when competition is present, and selection may sometimes
be inappropriate leading to (amongst other things) errors in
sequencing.
Part 3: Predictions of Apraxic Deficits
Based on the Affordance Competition
Hypothesis
Here, we discuss some implications of the affordance
competition hypothesis in relation to limb apraxia. We propose
a mechanism by which models which posit a direct route to
action, distinct from semantic, recognition processes, can be
integrated with this framework to reflect the dynamic nature of
action selection (Yoon et al., 2002).
Action Specification and Selection Performed
within Similar Networks of Brain Regions
The affordance competition hypothesis suggests that action
specification and action selection are performed by the same
neural circuits, distributed among a large set of brain regions.
Traditional definitions of limb apraxia have distinguished
between ideational apraxia, defined as an incapacity to evoke
the action associated with an object (Heilman et al., 1982), from
ideomotor apraxia where patientsmake spatio-temporal errors in
performing the appropriate gesture to a task. Ideational apraxia
has also been applied to describe patients who make errors in
selecting the correct target object when more than one object is
present.
A major problem for the field is that the differences between
these two forms of apraxia have been difficult to distinguish
as few patients show one set of symptoms in isolation from
symptoms characteristic of the other disorder (Buxbaum, 2001).
The affordance competition hypothesis would go further in
proposing that both types of apraxia are likely to be present to
some degree and that one may influence the other dynamically.
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In this framework ideomotor apraxia may implicate more dorsal
networks for action specification, whereas more ventral networks
for action selection would be related to ideational apraxia.
This parallels recent findings in the grasp literature, which
have challenged the view that reach and grasp components are
processed independently (Fattori et al., 2010; Vesia and Davare,
2011). Studies in non-human primates have revealed divisions
within the dorsal stream (dorso-dorsal and dorso-ventral) which
are thought to provide networks bridging separate functions for
reach and grasp behaviors (Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003; Daprati
and Sirigu, 2006).
Similarly, tractography studies are beginning to reveal the
detailed anatomical architecture of networks linking dorsal and
ventral stream pathways, with direct anatomical connections
between inferior parietal and temporal lobes being implicated
(Heilman and Watson, 2008; Ramayya et al., 2010).
Here data from lesion mapping studies either implicating
ventral premotor or inferior parietal areas in ideomotor apraxia
(Haaland et al., 2000; Pazzaglia et al., 2008; Kalénine et al., 2010)
may represent different facets of the same syndrome.
Competition Leading to “Blocking” Effects and
the Direct Route to Action Model
Previous neuropsychological studies describe several types of
‘‘blocking effect’’ in patients. For example patients with visual
apraxia, who have intact object recognition and good gesturing
to verbal command, may be poor at gesturing to visually
presented objects (Riddoch et al., 1989). Traditional models of
apraxia would predict that patients could use an intact semantic
route to action (see Figure 1). However this example suggests
that perceptual information interacts directly with semantic
information in selecting the appropriate action to make to an
object.
A convergent route model of action selection was proposed
by Yoon et al. (2002) to account for this effect. They used
an energy minimization network where the response derived
from action selection is determined by convergent activation
from separate semantic and perceptual representations. This
convergent activation pushes the network into a stable state (e.g.,
a learned output to a given stimulus), which acts as an attractor
(Hopfield, 1982). Any initial activation supplied is pushed by the
dynamics of the network and by other incoming inputs into a
‘‘basin of attraction’’.
In a study by Chainay and Humphreys (2002), this model
was able to accurately predict behavior in a number of
apraxic deficits. Most notably these authors documented apraxic
action errors in a patient with impaired semantic knowledge
about objects. Despite this, the use of real objects improved
action—without improving semantic identification. Chainay and
Humphreys (2002) argued that the sensory/perceptual input
directly impinged on action specification, facilitating selection of
the motor programme.
Although Yoon et al.’s (2002) model was suited for
mechanisms of human action selection, recent evidence from
animal neurophysiology studies have revealed that a similar
process takes place in non-human primates, for specification of
reaching movements (Churchland et al., 2007). The dynamics
of large scale neuronal populations were decoded to generate
models that account for activity in primary motor cortex
(Churchland et al., 2012).
In the affordance competition hypothesis, the dynamic nature
of interactions in motor responding is modelled implicitly.
Indeed action representations, cued by the environment are
likely available within fronto-parietal circuits, akin to the
aforementioned ‘‘basins for attraction’’. Biasing inputs from basal
ganglia or specific cortical areas (e.g., frontal cortex, depending
on the task set or parietal cortex, depending on changes in the
environment) pushes the network towards a specific action by
inhibiting unnecessary or competing ones.
Subtypes of Apraxia and the Affordance
Competition Hypothesis—Different Types
of Affordances?
Considering apraxia under this framework reframes it as a set
of disorders involving deficits in movement selection at different
levels—selection of the overall movement leading to ideational
apraxia or selection of specific movement parameters leading to
ideomotor apraxia.
In the former case, one would predict deficits in object use
arising due to there being problems in ‘‘affordances’’ triggering
appropriate actions. This may occur because of competition
between certain object characteristics which involve perception
for actions, or affordances. Ideational apraxia may thus arise
due to wrong actions being generated according to errors in
affordances. For example, an object may be recognized for its
use, yet present the actor with graspable features (affordances)
that may be similar to other objects (e.g., grasping a toothbrush
may be similar to grasping a knife) and lead to activation of
subsequent action representations that are inappropriate for the
object at hand. This maladaptive behavior may emerge from
affordance triggering incorrect actions within a ‘‘state space’’
of action representation (cf. Chainay and Humphreys, 2002).
Similarly, although the same object characteristics may generate
appropriate affordances, these may in turn trigger several action
representations. For example, the same object may be grasped
for different uses [e.g., a pen may be grasped to write with
or to move it to another location (Daprati and Sirigu, 2006)].
In this situation, patients may be unable to select from these
competing actions (or inhibit them) such that an action that
may be appropriate for the object but not specific to its use is
performed (picking up a pen and toying with it, rather than using
it to write).
In the case of ideomotor apraxia, affordance competition
would predict that alternative effectors are substituted for
performing an action. An example has been described by
Bekkering et al. (2005). They replicated results from an original
experiment reported by Goldenberg and Hagmann (1997) who
used a hand and finger gesture imitation task. Meaningless
gesture imitation has been used as a typical test of ideomotor
apraxia because it is thought to test a ‘‘direct pathway’’ to
gesture production that is not reliant on semantic memory
or object knowledge. Bekkering et al. suggested that errors
can arise in movement selection pertaining to a hierarchy
of goals, with more mistakes in action selection for items
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lower in the action hierarchy (such as the effector used
for an action) than those higher in the action hierarchy
(such as action goal)—a pattern of errors also found in
young children (Bekkering et al., 2000). Here, we suggest a
hierarchy of goals based on a conceptual, idea-guided goal and
subsequent perceptual-guidedmovements. Thus, when an action
is observed, the action goal is observed rather than the specific
movements.
Finally limb kinetic apraxia may arise because of failures
in selecting the appropriate gesture or muscle configurations,
from a range of possible alternatives, to perform a known and
contextually relevant action (Haaland et al., 1999).
These different forms of apraxia, categorized by the
affordance competition framework, may also be useful in
identifying the neural correlates of the disorder(s). For example,
we hypothesize that deficits in selecting appropriate actions
corresponding to affordances arise from lesions to parietal cortex
whereas deficits in the selection of gestures or finger movements
would involve fronto-striatal circuits.
One important implication of our hypotheses is that
patients with apraxia may exhibit various forms of response
inhibition, due to their failure to resolve affordance competition.
Studies have highlighted the importance of subcortical networks
(Redgrave et al., 2010) and have identified separate top-down and
bottom-up pathways in action selection (Rushworth et al., 2009;
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Duque et al., 2012). Further studies
are required to investigate whether response inhibition deficits,
in their own right, contribute to apraxic deficits particularly
in patient populations with basal ganglia disorders in whom
apraxia has been documented (Pramstaller and Marsden, 1996;
Leiguarda et al., 1997; Leiguarda and Marsden, 2000). These
speculations require empirical tests.
Conclusion
In this review, we present the affordance competition hypothesis
and discuss possible implications for limb apraxia. We propose
that this framework allows limb apraxia to be defined as a
set of disorders in which patients are overwhelmed by the
possibilities for action provided in the environment. Viewing
behavior as a dynamic process in which action specification and
selection occur in parallel allows for several observations to be
explained such as the frequent co-existence of ideational and
ideomotor deficits which have been debated at length. Moreover
the framework introduces the concept of affordances as being a
key trigger for action.
We believe that this framework will allow the generation
of further studies through testable hypotheses that may help
elucidate the complex and poorly understood disorder of apraxia.
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